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Case No. 9518
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS C. BOSWORTH and
DOROTHY BOSWORTH,
RespondPnts,

vs.
GEORGE I. NORMAN, JR., and
ROBERT SHERMAN, Partners, doing business as
Downbeat Broadcasting Associates,
Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties will be called plaintiffs and defendants.
The action involves a contract for the sale and purchase
of real property on Washington Boulevard in Ogden,
Utah, and the effect of a party wall agreement as to
the north wall of the building. For convenient reference
we quote the contract between the parties as follows :
"This 27th day of ,June, 1960, it is hereby intended and understood that Curtis C. Bosworth, his
wife, heirs, and assigns, herein referred to as
Sellers, agree to sell a certain building together
with its certain real property located at 2268
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, to George
I. Norman, Jr., and Robert Sherman, dba DOWN-
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BEAT BROADCASTING ASSOCIATES, operators of KSVN, a radio station located in Ogden,
Utah, herein referred to as the Buyers, for the
total price of $30,000.00 at the following terms:
"A $5,000.00 check to be held in escrow by
the Seller pending issuance of title insurance to be paid for by the Buyers, abstract
to be furnished to the Title Company by
the Sellers; a quit claim deed to be filed
and given to the Buyers from the Sellers;
and a first mortgage to be executed and filed
against said property to the benefit of the
Sellers in the amount of $25,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 7%.
"The Buyers will pay the Sellers $5,000.00
each and every year effective one year from
the date of the transfer of the deed until
the entire - balance of -$25,000.00 principal
plus interest at 7% amortized but on the
unpaid balance only, is paid. Payment to
be made in one installment annually.
"Buyers are assured by the Sellers at the
time of closing that all taxes, encumbrances,
liens or any other possible indebtedness has
been paid in full and is their (Sellers') complete liability. BuyerR pay all taxes after
July 1, 1960.
"This being the entire written and oral agreement between Buyers and Sellers this 27th
day of June, 1960. Buyers pay all costs and
attorneys' fees in case of default."
2
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Plaintiffs take issue with defendant's state1nent of
fact that there was a discrepancy as to ownership of the
south one inch of the property. They also take issue
with the statement that upon learning of the plaintiffs'
party wall agreement, defendants immediately notified
plaintiffs they could not proceed with the contract; and
also take issue with the statement that because of the
party wall defendants could not remodel the building.
We think, however, these last two factual disputes are
of no great consequence on this appeal.
Additional important facts are these : The property
involved in this transaction is located on Washington
Boulevard in the center of the business district (T-5).
Plaintiffs afforded defendants ample opportunity to inspect the premises and they did inspect the same before
purchasing (T-8, 39, 41). Plaintiffs wanted defendants
to wait and have the transaction handled in a normal
manner with attorneys for both parties involved. Defendants refused to wait and insisted on closing the
transaction immediately (T-9, 10). The party wall in
question was plainly visible and ascertainable by physical inspection (T-19, 34, 37, 97). There is no suggestion
in the evidence that plaintiffs were unaware of the party
wall after they inspected the premises, or that the party
wall was of any importance. It was not of any importance to plaintiffs (T-19). The trial court personally viewed the premises before making its Findings of Fact.
The contract was at least largely drafted by the defendants (T-10, 101). There is no sugestion in the evidence
that plaintiffs sought to mislead defendants with respect
to the party wall or to conceal it from defendants. The
sale of the property in question was by street number
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and not by metes and bounds (Exhibit A), and there
are no affirmative obligations imposed by the party wall
agreement (Page 45· of Abstract of Title, Exhibit D).
Aside from the fact that the sale was by quit claim
deed, we make the following observations regarding the
alleged one-inch discrepancy in the south boundary of
the property:
( 1) If such a discrepancy existed and if a warranty
deed had been called for, this would not be a material
discrepancy.

( 2) There is in fact no one-inch discrepancy that is
a cloud on the title. We can't cite the court to the page
of the abstract (Exhibit D) where this one-inch discrepancy is found; however, as shown in the abstract of title
and in the title report (Exhibit 1), a stranger to the
title conveyed property on the south of the property
involved in this lawsuit and the description in this stranger conveyance overlaps one inch. This is not a cloud
on the title. (See Utah State Bar Association Title Standard No. 9.)
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

Point 1: The trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.
Point 2: The trial court did not err in dismissing
defendants' counterc.laim.
ARGUMENT

Point 1: The trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to dismiss the con1plaint.

4
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DefendantH' motion to dismiss was made at the
conclusion of the plaintiffs' case and before defendants
offered evidence. It appears to us, however, that the
whole question involved here is whether or not there was
fraud, and in our consideration of this Point 1 we shall
review all the evidence in the case, since reading the
transcript will certainly show plaintiffs' case was at
least as strong before defendants' case was presented
as it was at the conclusion of the trial. Actually, Points
1 and 2 may be considered together, since both are founded upon alleged fraud of the plaintiffs. Perhaps an orderly presentation of the points would require that we
review only the plaintiffs' testimony against the la\v
on fraud to determine if that testimony shows fraud
as a matter of law. We believe, however, that the whole
picture can best be presented if we review all the evidence on both sides to see if the court erred in holding
that there was no fraud.
The contract called for conveyance by quit claim
deed. It contained this provision:
"Buyers are assured by the Sellers at the time
of closing that all taxes, encumbrances, liens or
other possible indebtedness has been paid in
full .... "
It is this language that defendants seek to balloon into
a representation by plaintiffs that there was no party
wall agreement affecting the property. Our, first inquiry, then, is whether or not this language is susceptible of such an interpretation. We believe it is not.
The court must make its own interpretation of this
language, and we- find no authorities one way or the
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other that are helpful to the court in making its interpretation. A statement of our own interpretation is admittedly of little value to the court. We must state,
however, that read in its entire context the Sellers by
this language merely assure the Buyers that they don't
owe anything on the property. It is an assurance that
there is no mortgagee, lienholder or the like to arise
and contest the sale and conveyance. It is an assurance
that the Buyers are dealing with the persons who are
able to consummate the sale and that even though the
conveyance is by quit claim, the Sellers have good right
to convey and will assume and pay any indebtednes~
existing against the property. To balloon such ambiguous
language into a false and fraudulent representation as
to the condition of the premises is, we feel, unwarranted.
It is unwarranted particularly where, as here, the contract is in large measure the Buyers' contract, which
Sellers were, to some degree at least, pressured into
signing.
"The language of a covenant must be read in an
ordinary or popular, and not in a legal or technical sense. 21 CJS Page 896."
" ... the representation must contain the essential
elements of fraud; and it must be definite and
specific, mere vague, general or indefinite statements being insufficient, .... " 37 CJS Page 224.
Let us assume, however, a less ambiguous statement. Assume the contract provided as follows: "Sellers warrant the premises are free from all encumbrances". This is the language that would be impliedly
contained in a warranty deed. Would the existence of
a party wall agreement make this statement a false and

6
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fraudulent representation~ vVe find no cases on the
fraud question specifically. However, if the party wall
agreement would not constitute a breach of this express
warranty, by the same token its existence would certainly not make the representation false and fraudulent.
The cases hold that under similar circumstances a party
wall agreement does not violate a warranty against encumbrances.
We find no Utah cases. What appears to be the
general rule is stated in 92 C.JS, paragraph 206, page
66, as follows :
"Ordinarily a party wall easement is not an
encumbrance warranting rejection of title by a
purchaser contracting for a conveyance free of
encumbrances, a mutual easement of adjoining
proprietors in a party wall being a benefit and
not a burden. It has been held that a party wall
is not such an encumbrance as justifies rejection
of title where there is no representation on the
subject in the contract, where existence of party
walls is plainly discernible from inspection of
the premises, and where the party wall agreement contains no covenant to rebuild but relates
solely to the existing wall as long as it may stand,
or where the sale was by house number instead
of by metes and bounds; nor is a party wall agreement an encumbrance where it is a mere personal
covenant not running with the land."
As to the party wall in this case, there is no representation on the subject in the contract. The evidence
indicates the party wall is plainly discernible from in-
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spection, the party wall agreement contains no covenant
to rebuild, and the sale was by house number and not
be metes and bounds.
American Jurisprudence states the rule as follows:
"The question whether the existence of a
party wall upon or at the division line between
the vendor's land and the land of an adjoining
owner used or intended to be used by both in the
construction or maintenance of buildings on
their respective tracts, or an agreement for the
construction and maintenance of such a wall of
such character as to run with the land, constitutes
an encumbrance within the meaning of the rule
which requires the vendor in a contract for the
sale of land free and clear of encumbrances is a
question upon which the decisions are not entirely
consistent. 1\fost of the difficulty seems to arise,
however, from the fact that in some cases the
party wall was erected entirely upon the land
of the vendor, or he and his successors in interest were obligated to maintain, repair, or rebuild the wall in case of injury 'or destruction,
whereas in other cases the wall rested upon the
properties of both adjoining owners for their
mutual advantage and benefit. The rule supported by the majority of the cases and by sound
reasoning is that a party wall standing equally
upon the land of adjoining proprietors, the central line of which is throughout coincident with
the line . of division between the respective premises, constitutes no such encmnbrance upon or
defect in the title of either owner as will relieve
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a purchaser from his contract to purchase the
land, :-;o long, at least, as no onerous burdens in
respect of repair or rebuilding are imposed upon
the owner thereof; where the wall rests equally
upon both lots the detriment sustained by each
tenement, in becoming servient to the other, is
compensated by the benefit it derives from having the other made equally servient to it. The mutual easement for the support of the wall is a
benefit, and not a burden, to the purchaser as
well as to the adjacent proprietor. It is a valuable
appurtenance, which passes with the title of the
property, and its value to the purchaser is not
diminished by the fact that it is equally beneficial to the adjacent owners." 55 American J urisprudence, Vendor and Purchaser, page 686.
It seems, therefore, that even if the language of the
contract unambiguously and specifically stated what defendants contend that this language says, and even if
all the other elements of fraud were present in this case,
there would still be no fraudulent representation because
t~e existence of the party wall agreement is not inconsistent with the warranty or representation that there
are no encumbrances.
However, are all or even any of the other elements
of fraud present in this case~ The essential elements of
fraud were not pleaded by defendants, but we make no
objection to this since we have previously made none.
Nonetheless, all the essential elements must be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence so as to satisfy the
trier of fact.
9
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The nine essential elements of fraud are set forth
in Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227
Pac. 791, as follows:
" ' * * * (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its 1nateriality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; ( 5)
his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the manner reasonably comtemplated;
(6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his
reliance upon its truth; (8) his right to rely
thereon; (9) his consequent and proximate injury'."
We don't propose to consider and weigh separately
each of these nine essential elements against the evidence. However, the following facts stand out: The party
wall was of no importance, no materiality, to Mr. Bosworth when he himself acquired the property (T-19).
He at no time attached any real significance to it. It
was plainly visible on inspection, and Mr. Bosworth
gave defendants every reasonable opporhmity to inspect. If it was clearly discernible to him, to the architect on first glance, and to the trial court, how can it
reasonably be said that he knew, after defendants had
both inspected the property, that they were unaware of
it? And how can it be said that it suddently became of
vital importance to him and he designedly concealed it
from them 1 The parties were dealing at anns length,
and Mr. Bosworth tried to avoid this quick transaction
-tried to involve attorneys to handle the transaction
in the normal1nanner. Defendant N onnan almost punched witness Giles in the nose when Giles urged the parties
to wait and handle it right (T-10). The defendants had
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inspected the building, they wanted it, they wanted it immediately, and they wanted no lawyer foolishness involved in their purchase. Just a little delay would have
disclosed the party wall agreement (but we don't think
it would have made a particle of difference to the defendants at that time). They resisted all efforts at delay,
and now they Ray they were fraudulently taken advantage of.
Did Mr. Bosworth have a duty to speak up· about
the wall o? If he knew that even after inspection defendants were not aware of the wall; and if he knew that it
was of vital importance to them, or at least of materialty to them; and if he knew they would not buy the
property if he spoke, then perhaps there might be fraud
in failing to speak if all the other elements of fraud
were present. But the evidence just does not permit the
resolving of all these 'ifs' preponderantly for the defendantf;.
We feel justified in concluding, therefore, without
further belaboring the matter, that the court did not
err in concluding as a factual matter there was no fraud
on the part of the plaintiffs justifiably relied upon by
the defendants that would either justify their rescission
of the contract or support their claim to damages. We
feel that we need not in this brief specifically respond
to defendants' second point, since this whole brief is a
responRe to that point as well as to the first point.
In conclusion, we acknowledge the right of the
Supreme Court to reverse the trial court on its factual
findings. We appreciate, too, however, that the Supreme
Court has frequently admonished litigants it would not
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reverse the findings of the trial court in an equity case
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against those
findings. The trial court had many advantages not available to the appellate court, not the least of which was
the opportunity to visually inspect the premises. Speaking most conservatively, the least that can be said about
the evidence in this case is that the trial court's factual
findings are not unreasonable and they should be sustained on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Daniel A. Alsup
of
Richards, Alsup & Richards
Attorneys for Respondents
2640 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah
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